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Abstract
Background: The etiology of severe pneumonia is frequently not identified by routine disease surveillance in
Thailand. Since 2010, the Thailand Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and US CDC have conducted surveillance to
detect known and new etiologies of severe pneumonia.
Methods: Surveillance for severe community-acquired pneumonia was initiated in December 2010 among 30
hospitals in 17 provinces covering all regions of Thailand. Interlinked clinical, laboratory, pathological and
epidemiological components of the network were created with specialized guidelines for each to aid case
investigation and notification. Severe pneumonia was defined as chest-radiograph confirmed pneumonia of
unknown etiology in a patient hospitalized ≤48 h and requiring intubation with ventilator support or who died
within 48 h after hospitalization; patients with underlying chronic pulmonary or neurological disease were excluded.
Respiratory and pathological specimens were tested by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction for nine
viruses, including Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and 14 bacteria. Cases were reported
via a secure web-based system.
Results: Of specimens from 972 cases available for testing during December 2010 through December 2015, 589
(60.6%) had a potential etiology identified; 399 (67.8%) were from children aged < 5 years. At least one viral agent
was detected in 394 (40.5%) cases, with the most common of single vial pathogen detected being respiratory
syncytial virus (RSV) (110/589, 18.7%) especially in children under 5 years. Bacterial pathogens were detected in 341
cases of which 67 cases had apparent mixed infections. The system added MERS-CoV testing in September 2012 as
part of Thailand’s outbreak preparedness; no cases were identified from the 767 samples tested.
Conclusions: Enhanced surveillance improved the understanding of the etiology of severe pneumonia cases and
improved the MOPH’s preparedness and response capacity for emerging respiratory pathogens in Thailand thereby
enhanced global health security. Guidelines for investigation of severe pneumonia from this project were
incorporated into surveillance and research activities within Thailand and shared for adaption by other countries.
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Background
Emerging or re-emerging infections, including avian in-
fluenza (AI), pandemic human influenza and corona-
viruses such as severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS--
CoV), can cause severe respiratory illness and death and
cause international outbreaks that can threaten global
health security [1–6]. In 2003 and 2004, the World
Health Organization reported that the avian influenza A
H5N1 virus had spread from Asia to Europe and Africa,
resulting in millions of poultry infections, 50 human
cases, and 36 human deaths [7, 8]. These avian influenza
outbreaks have had serious impact on national econ-
omies and international trade. In response, the Thailand
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) established the Na-
tional Avian Influenza Surveillance (NAIS) system in
2004 to detect influenza in severe pneumonia patients
[9]. However, due to limited resources, the NAIS did not
conduct diagnostic testing for other pathogens in severe
pneumonia cases that tested negative for influenza. To
expand this influenza-specific system, an enhanced sur-
veillance system for severe and fatal pneumonia (SevPn)
was established by the Bureau of Epidemiology (BOE)
and National Institute of Health (NIH), Thailand
MOPH, in collaboration with the United States Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC).
On December 1, 2010, the SevPn surveillance network
began among 30 public hospitals in 17 provinces in
Thailand with the following objectives: identify potential
pathogens causing severe pneumonia; create networks to
develop standardized guidelines for case investigation;
provide clinical consultation or diagnostic services; and
create a database of severe pneumonia cases and a speci-
men bank of samples from these cases for potential fu-
ture testing when new methods are available. Findings
from this surveillance system was intended to provide
information that lead to some policy changes or recom-
mendation on pneumonia case management guidelines
in the future.
This report describes the methodology of the SevPn
surveillance system and provides preliminary results on
each of its objectives from December 2010 through De-
cember 2015.
Methods
Surveillance sites
Thailand is a middle to high income country with the
estimated population of 69 million in 2016. The popula-
tion density was 135 people per square kilometer and
varies from 100 to 250 people per square kilometer in
each region [10]. Surveillance was conducted in 17 prov-
inces in all five regions of Thailand (Fig. 1). The 30 par-
ticipating hospitals in these provinces were selected
based on having an intensive care unit and hospital staff
willing to participate in the SevPn activities.
Surveillance system structure
Clinical network
This network, established by BOE, comprised experts in
clinical infectious diseases, virology, bacteriology, radi-
ology, pathology and epidemiology. The network, based
in Bangkok with members from MOPH and various aca-
demic centers, developed the severe pneumonia case
definition, notification and investigation guidelines for
SevPn surveillance. The expert members of this network
served as technical consultants for physicians and nurses
at the surveillance hospitals who identified cases and
provided treatment. The focal person was the project
data officer at BOE, but physicians were able to contact
the experts directly or through the BOE.
Laboratory network
The laboratory network provided laboratory testing and
consultation to the clinicians of the surveillance hospi-
tals and transferred specimens to other laboratories as
needed. The focal point was a staff member at the speci-
men receiving and distributing center of NIH.
Pathology network
The pathology network comprised medical and veterinary
pathologists from academic centers and the Thailand Zoo-
logical Park Organization and developed post-mortem
examination guidelines. These guidelines instructed
non-pathologists in performing percutaneous transtho-
racic lung needle biopsy to collect appropriate and ad-
equate lung tissue in fatal pneumonia cases. The network
provided consultations on autopsy and histopathology
testing through the pathology focal points, which were the
four regional pathology network hubs located in the aca-
demic institutions in each of these regions; in the North,
Northeast, South and Central regions of Thailand.
Epidemiology network
This network operated through epidemiologists in the
30 surveillance hospitals who also served as members of
‘Surveillance and Rapid Response Teams’ (SRRT) nation-
wide. The SRRT is a national system of epidemiology
and investigation teams from the central through com-
munity level established in 2004 to rapidly detect and
respond to emerging public health threats. The SRRTs
performed disease surveillance for outbreaks, conducted
field investigations and implemented necessary re-
sponses [11]. The hospital epidemiologist performed
case notification and investigation at the hospitals where
SevPn cases were identified. There were also SRRT epi-
demiologists at the district, provincial, and community
levels who worked closely with the hospital SRRT on
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case investigations for severe pneumonia cases, particu-
larly for cases with contact with sick persons or sick or
dead poultry or other animals, or with a history of travel.
The focal person for the epidemiology network was the
project manager at the BOE.
Surveillance case definition
A severe pneumonia case was defined as community-ac-
quired pneumonia (CAP) with radiographic findings consist-
ent with pneumonia as determined by clinician or
radiologist, no etiology was identified by laboratory testing
available at the hospital and in a patient aged ≥2
months, requiring ventilator support and hospitalized
≤48 h. Cases also included patients with CAP who died
without being ventilated and within 48 h of admission.
Patients were excluded if illness onset occurred ≥2
weeks before identification or if they had been hospital-
ized within the prior week. Patients were also excluded
if they had known hospital-acquired pneumonia,
chronic pulmonary disease (chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease, chronic bronchitis, chronic bronchiec-
tasis or pulmonary dysplasia in children), swallowing
Fig. 1 Author created a regional map of the site locations for severe pneumonia enhanced surveillance network in Thailand from 2010 to 2015
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dysfunction, or a neurological condition causing inabil-
ity to perform daily activities.
Case finding and ascertainment
At each surveillance hospital, a designated focal person
for the SevPn network ensured that the guidelines devel-
oped by the clinical network were followed. The focal
persons, hospital physicians and nurses, were trained by
BOE project staff on the surveillance case definition, ex-
clusion criteria, data entry systems, and specimen collec-
tion and handling, including post mortem transthoracic
needle biopsy. On a daily basis, each hospital focal per-
son screened patients admitted to the intensive care unit
to assess if they met the SevPn case definition.
Collection of clinical information and specimens
Demographic, clinical, epidemiological and hospital la-
boratory information were collected from each patient’s
medical record by the surveillance site focal person
using a standard case report form and entered into an
online reporting system. Data were updated when the
patient was discharged from the hospital. In addition to
routine specimens collected for clinical care, including
blood culture, clinicians collected tracheal aspirates
(intubated patients), acute serum and convalescent
serum at 2 weeks later if possible. Nasopharyngeal or
throat swabs were collected in patients who died without
intubation. In fatal cases, Transthoracic cardiac puncture
was encouraged to collect heart blood if serum was not
available; if consent was provided, lung tissue specimens
were collected by transthoracic needle biopsy [12] and
deposited in two sterile tubes and a separate container
with 10% formalin. All specimens were kept cold and
sent to NIH within 24 h.
Laboratory testing
Respiratory, blood, and serum specimens were shipped
to NIH in Bangkok where they were stored and tested
or sent to other academic centers that had laboratory
capacity for further testing based on clinician request.
For the tracheal aspirates, viral and bacterial testing were
performed on different samples. Tracheal aspirates in
viral transport media (VTM) were tested by multiplex
real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reac-
tion (rRT-PCR) [13] for a panel of six viruses including
influenza A and B, parainfluenza virus, adenovirus,
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and human metapneu-
movirus. Singleplex rRT-PCR was performed for subtyp-
ing of influenza A-positive specimens and for MERS
Co-V starting in September 2012 [14]. For bacterial test-
ing, tracheal aspirates in sterile tubes (without VTM)
were tested by conventional multiplex PCR for 11 bacter-
ial pathogens: Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus
influenzae, Moraxella catarrhalis, Klebsiella pneumoniae,
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Acinetobacter baumannii, Ste-
notrophomonas maltophilia, Escherichia coli, Staphylococ-
cus aureus, Burkholderia pseudomallei and Acinetobacter
species. A separate multiplex real-time PCR was used to
detect atypical bacteria including Mycoplasma pneumo-
niae, Chlamydophila pneumoniae, and Legionella species.
All multiplex PCRs used for testing were developed by the
NIH [15].
Lung tissue from fatal cases were sent to the regional
pathology network for histopathological testing where
they were embedded in paraffin, cut into 3 μm-thick sec-
tions, deparaffinized in xylene, and rehydrated in graded
alcohol. Each section was stained with hematoxylin and
eosin. Additional specialized testing was performed if
there was clinical suspicion for a particular disease, such
as silver staining for Pneumocystis jirovecii. Acute serum
and/or convalescent serum were sent for serological test-
ing and storage for further diagnostic testing if required
by the clinical committees.
Case reporting and monitoring
The case reporting system at BOE and the laboratory test-
ing system at NIH were activated when a focal person at a
surveillance hospital entered the patient’s information into
the online reporting system. After the specimens arrived
and were tested at NIH, a focal person at the laboratory
entered the test result in the online system.
At BOE, the project data officer routinely checked the
data on the severe pneumonia web-based system and
followed up with the hospital focal person as needed to
ensure the accuracy and completeness of the report. A
report was considered complete when all fields of the
online case record form were completed. Laboratory re-
sults were made available to the attending physicians in
each hospital via a password protected online database.
BOE posted monthly, quarterly and annual severe and
fatal pneumonia surveillance reports on the BOE website
that were available to the public (Fig. 2). Each hospital
was able to export their data and conduct hospital-level
reports themselves.
Medical and laboratory records from all cases were
reviewed and presented in a quarterly clinical network
meeting to confirm that reported cases met the case def-
inition and, through a case review process, assign the
likely causative pathogen. The expert committee also
suggested additional testing that might be necessary for
a final etiologic determination.
Surveillance audit
SevPn surveillance staff conducted two surveillance au-
dits in all 30 hospitals during the 4 years of project im-
plementation. The first audit was conducted during
2011–2012 and the second during 2013–2014. BOE
staff, including physicians, nurses and data officers,
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visited each hospital. They reviewed the medical
records of all hospitalized patients who required
mechanical ventilation and had been discharged with
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10)
codes consistent with a diagnosis of pneumonia in-
cluding codes J12 to J16 and J18 and who were ad-
mitted during the selected 3-month audit period.
Once potential cases were identified, all medical re-
cords were reviewed to determine whether they met
the surveillance case definition and had been re-
ported to the SevPn system.
Data analysis
The sensitivity of the SevPn system was calculated by div-
iding the number of cases reported to the surveillance sys-
tem that met the SevPn case definition by the total
number of eligible cases (number of cases meeting the
SevPn case definition from chart review audit). Descriptive
Fig. 2 Structure of severe pneumonia enhanced surveillance network
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data are presented as frequencies for discrete variables,
and mean or median for continuous variables. SPSS ver-
sion 18.0 was used for all analyses.
Ethical review
The study proposal was reviewed and determined to be
a routine public health activity for public health surveil-
lance by Thailand MOPH Ethical Review Committee.
Confidentiality was maintained by using a password pro-
tected online system that limited access to authorized
persons.
Results
Demographic data
A total of 972 patients met the case definition of severe
pneumonia of unknown etiology, including 220 (22.6%)
fatal cases, and were reported to the BOE severe pneu-
monia system during December 2010 through December
2015 (Table 1). Of these, 580 (59.7%) were male. The
majority (61.7%) were children aged < 5 years and the
largest proportion (35.1%) of cases came from the south-
ern region of Thailand. Of 220 fatal cases, lung biopsy
was performed in 13 (5.9%).
Types of specimen
Tracheal secretion was the main specimen tested for vi-
ruses (946, 99.4%) and bacteria (823, 99%) while five
cases had lung tissues tested for bacterial and four cases
for viruses. Only two NP swabs were sent for viral and
bacterial testing. Twenty cases had no specimen for viral
testing and 141 cases had no specimen for bacterial
testing either because the hospital did not sent the speci-
men or the specimens were not adequate for testing.
Blood cultures were done at the participating hospitals
per their routine practice and only 337 patients (34.7%)
had results available.
Etiologic identification
All reported cases had at least one specimen submitted
for testing. Among respiratory specimens from all 972
cases, 589 (60.6%) tested positive for at least one poten-
tial pathogen (Table 2). A virus was detected in 394
(40.5%) of cases with 236 (24.3%) of cases having a single
virus as the only detected pathogen. RSV was the most
commonly detected virus overall (12.3%), followed by in-
fluenza A and influenza B (3.9%), and adenovirus (3.0%).
A bacteria was detected in 341 (35%) of cases with 128
(13.2%) of cases, having a single bacteria as the only de-
tected pathogen. M. pneumoniae was the most com-
monly detected bacteria overall (4.2%), followed by H.
influenzae (1.7%), M. catarrhalis (1.4%) and S. pneumo-
niae (1.0%). Mixed detection were found in 225 cases
(23.1%).
Among children aged < 5 years, RSV was the most
common single pathogen detected (110, 18.7%), followed
by adenovirus (28, 4.8%) and parainfluenza type 3 (11,
0.5%). For patients ≥5 years, M. pneumoniae was found
in 21 (3.6%) cases, followed by influenza A (H1N1)
pdm09 (14, 2.4%) and RSV (10, 1.7%) (Table 2). No
pathogen was detected in 383 (39.4%) of specimens
tested. Only 13 of 220 fatal cases had lung biopsy per-
formed, and five (38.5%) had pathogens identified from
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of patients enrolled in the severe pneumonia enhanced surveillance network, Thailand
2010–2015
Characteristics Fatal cases (%) Non-fatal cases (%) Overall (%)
Reported pneumonia cases N = 220 N = 752 N = 972
Male 134 (60.9) 446 (59.3) 580 (59.7)
Female 86 (39.1) 306 (40.7) 392 (40.3)
Region
North 74 (33.6) 215 (28.6) 289 (29.7)
Northeast 10 (4.6) 14 (1.9) 24 (2.5)
East 18 (8.2) 59 (7.8) 77 (7.9)
Central 92 (41.8) 149 (19.8) 241 (24.8)
South 26 (11.8) 315 (42.9) 341 (35.1)
Age group (Year)
< 5 60 (27.3) 540 (71.8) 600 (61.7)
5–9 7 (3.2) 28 (3.7) 35 (3.6)
10–19 10 (4.5) 18 (2.4) 28 (2.9)
20–39 33 (15.) 35 (4.7) 68 (7.0)
40–60 42 (19.1) 53 (7.0) 95 (9.8)
> 60 68 (30.9) 78 (10.4) 146 (15.0)
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lung tissues by PCR techniques: parainfluenza virus type 3
(1), C. pneumoniae (1), Acinetobacter calcoaceticus (1), K.
pneumoniae and A. lwoffii (1), A. baumannii and influ-
enza A (H1N1) pdm09 (1) all results from lung biopsy did
not have similar PCR results on respiratory specimens.
Of the 337 cases where blood for culture was collected
and incubated at the hospitals, only 27 cases had positive
result and in six cases these blood culture results
matched with the result of the PCR testing from NIH of
respiratory specimens; S. pneumoniae (3), A. baumannii
(1), K. pneumoniae (1) and B pseudomallei (1).
From 589 cases that had positive laboratory results, 485
(82.3%) cases were reviewed by the severe pneumonia
clinical network; 412 (69.9%) met the severe pneumonia
case definition and consensus was reached on a likely
causative agent in 406 (68.9%) (Table 3). Bacterial infec-
tion was more common among fatal cases while viral in-
fection was more common among non-fatal cases. Since
MERS-CoV testing was initiated in September 2012, no
cases have been identified among the 767 patients tested.
Surveillance performance
Of 1101 cases identified by surveillance audit who met
the SevPn case definition based on chart review, 158 had
been reported to the system for a sensitivity of 14.4%
(Table 4). The sensitivity in 2011–2012 was 6.5%,
Table 2 Pathogens detected through enhanced surveillance for severe pneumonia, by patient outcome, Thailand 2010–2015
Findings Age < 5 years Age > 5 years
Fatal cases (%) Non-fatal cases (%) Overall (%) Fatal cases (%) Non-fatal cases (%) Overall (%)
Reported cases 60 (6.2) 540 (55.5) 600 (61.7) 160 (16.5) 212 (21.8) 372 (38.3)
Cases with positive laboratory results 31 (5.3) 368 (62.5) 399 (67.7) 94 (16) 96 (6.3) 190 (32.3)
Virusa 17 (3) 167 (28.4) 184 (31.2) 21 (3.6) 31 (5.3) 52 (8.8)
RSV 7 (1.2) 103 (17.5) 110 (18.7) 3 (0.5) 7 (1.2) 10 (1.7)
Adenovirus 2 (0.3) 26 (4.4) 28 (4.7) 1 (0.1) 0 1 (0.16)
Human metapneumovirus 2 (0.3) 13 (2.2) 15 (2.5) 2 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 5 (0.8)
Influenza virus A (H1N1) pdm009 1 (0.1) 29 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 7 (1.2) 7 (1.2) 14 (2.4)
Parainfluenza type 3 2 (0.3) 9 (1.5) 11 (1.8) 2 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 5 (0.8)
Influenza virus A/H3 2 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 5 (0.8) 5 (0.8) 4 (0.7) 9 (1.5)
Parainfluenza type 1 0 5 (0.8) 5 (0.8) 0 2 (0.3) 2 (0.3)
Influenza virus B 0 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1) 5 (0.8) 6 (1)
Parainfluenza type 2 1 (0.1) 5 (0.8) 6 (1) 0 0 0
Bacteriab 7 (1.2) 59 (10) 66 (11.2) 31 (5.2) 31 (5.2) 62 (10.5)
Mycoplasma pneumoniae 1 (0.1) 19 (3.2) 20 (3.4) 9 (1.5) 12 (2.0) 21 (3.5)
Chlamydophila pneumoniae 1 (0.1) 14 (2.4) 15 (2.5) 2 (0.3) 3 (0.5) 5 (0.8)
Haemophilus influenzae 1 (0.1) 8 (1.3) 9 (1.5) 3 (0.5) 4 (0.7) 7 (1.2)
Moraxella catarrhalis 1 (0.1) 11 (1.8) 12 (20.3) 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1) 2 (0.3)
Klebsiella pneumoniae 2 (0.3) 4 (0.7) 6 (1) 2 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 49 (0.7)
Streptococcus pneumoniae 0 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1) 5 (0.8) 4 (0.7) 9 (1.5)
Staphylococcus aureus 1 (0.1) 0 1 (0.1) 3 (0.5) 3 (0.5) 6 (1)
Acinetobacter baumannii 0 0 0 3 (0.5) 0 2 (0.3)
Escherichia coli 0 2 (0.3) 2 (0.3) 0 0 0
Burkholderia pseudomallei 0 0 0 2 (0.3) 0 2 (0.3)
Acinetobacter calcoaceticus 0 0 0 1 (0.1) 0 1 (0.1)
Legionella spp. 0 0 0 0 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1)
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 0 0 0 0 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1)
Mixed detection 7 (1.2) 142 (24.1) 149 (25.3) 42 (7.1) 34 (5.8) 76 (12.9)
Mixed viral detection 1 (0.1) 9 (1.5) 10 (1.7) 1 (0.1) 1 (0.1) 2 (0.3)
Mixed bacterial detection 1 (0.1) 25 (4.2) 26 (4.4) 26 (4.4) 15 (2.5) 41 (6.9)
Mixed viral and bacterial detection 5 (0.8) 108 (18.3) 113 (19.2) 15 (2.5) 18 (3) 33 (5.6)
aSingle viral pathogen identified
bSingle bacterial pathogen identified
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increasing to 18.1% in 2013–2014. Case reporting in-
creased in all regions between the two periods. Sensitiv-
ity of the system was highest in the southern region and
lowest in the northeastern region during both audits. Be-
tween 2011 and 2014 the number of cases reported to
the system steadily increased from an average of nine
cases a month in 2011 to 16 cases a month in 2014.
Discussion
Enhanced surveillance for severe pneumonia was imple-
mented in Thailand in response to a need to improve
identification of the causes of unexplained respiratory
deaths and critical illnesses [8, 9]. During 5 years of sur-
veillance, the system strengthened the overall ability of
the Thailand MOPH to identify pathogens causing se-
vere pneumonia and demonstrated the significance of
RSV as a cause of fatal and non-fatal pneumonia cases,
in both adults and children.
Additional benefits of the system included improving
the investigation of severe pneumonia cases through the
use of standardized guidelines, although surveillance
sensitivity, while improved over time, remained low.
Table 3 Etiology of severe pneumonia cases reported to the severe pneumonia surveillance system based on case reviews by the
Clinical Network, Thailand 2010–2015
Findings of review cases with
positive laboratory result that met
SevPn case definition
Age < 5 year Age > 5 years
Fatal cases (%) Non-fatal cases (%) Overall (%) Fatal cases (%) Non-fatal cases (%) Overall (%)
N = 14 N = 268 N = 282 N = 53 N = 77 N = 130
Virusa 6 (42.8) 114 (42.5) 120 (42.5) 13 (24.5) 29 (37.6) 42 (32.3)
RSV 1 (7.1) 67 (25.0) 68 (24.1) 0 8 (10.4) 8 (6.1)
Adenovirus 1 (7.1) 18 (6.7) 19 (6.7) 1 (1.9) 1 (1.3) 2 (1.5)
Human metapneumovirus 1 (7.1) 13 (4.8) 14 (4.9) 0 3 (3.9) 3 (2.3)
Influenza virus A (H1N1) pdm009 1 (7.1) 2 (0.7) 3 (1.1) 6 (11.3) 6 (7.8) 12 (9.2)
Parainfluenza type 3 1 (7.1) 5 (1.8) 6 (2.1) 1 (1.9) 4 (5.2) 5 (3.8)
Influenza virus A/H3 0 1 (0.3) 1 (.3) 4 (7.5) 3 (3.9) 7 (5.4)
Parainfluenza type 1 0 3 (1.1) 3 (1.1) 0 3 (3.9) 3 (2.3)
Influenza virus B 1 (7.1) 2 (0.7) 3 (1.1) 1 (1.9) 1 (1.3) 2 (1.5)
Parainfluenza type 2 0 3 (1.1) 3 (1.1) 0 0 0
Bacteriab 3 (21.4) 41 (15.3) 45 (15.9) 23 (43.4) 18 (23.4) 41 (31.5)
Mycoplasma pneumoniae 1 (7.1) 9 (3.3) 10 (3.5) 3 (5.6) 6 (7.8) 9 (6.9)
Chlamydophila pneumoniae 0 8 (2.9) 8 (2.8) 0 0 0
Chryseobacterium meningosepticum 0 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 0 0 0
Haemophilus influenzae 0 7 (2.6) 7 (2.5) 1 (1.9) 1 (1.3) 2 (1.5)
Moraxella catarrhalis 0 9 (3.3) 9 (3.2) 1 (1.9) 1 (1.3) 2 (1.5)
Klebsiella pneumoniae 2 (14.2) 2 (0.7) 4 (1.4) 4 (7.5) 3 (3.9) 7 (5.4)
Streptococcus pneumoniae 0 2 (0.7) 2 (0.7) 6 (11.3) 1 (1.3) 7 (5.4)
Staphylococcus aureus 0 1 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 2 (3.8) 3 (3.9) 5 (3.8)
Acinetobacter baumannii 0 0 0 1 (1.9) 2 (2.6) 3 (2.3)
Escherichia coli 0 3 (1.1) 3 (1.1) 2 (3.8) 0 2 (1.5)
Burkholderia pseudomallei 0 0 0 2 (3.8) 0 2 (1.5)
Acinetobacter calcoaceticus 0 0 0 1 (1.9) 0 1 (0.7)
Legionella spp. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 0 0 0 0 1 (1.3) 1 (0.7)
Mixed detection 5 (35.7) 112 (41.8) 117 (41.4) 15 (28.3) 26 (33.7) 41 (31.5)
Mixed viral detection 0 3 (1.1) 3 (1.1) 2 (3.8) 1 (1.3) 3 (2.3)
Mixed bacterial detection 1 (7.1) 15 (5.6) 16 (5.7) 5 (9.4) 10 (12.9) 15 (11.5)
Mixed viral and bacterial detection 4 (28.6) 94 (35.1) 98 (34.7) 8 (15.1) 15 (19.4) 23 (17.7)
Inconclusive 0 0 0 2 (3.8) 4 (5.2) 6 (4.6)
aSingle viral pathogen identified
bSingle bacterial pathogen identified
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Enhanced surveillance captured just over 6% of eligible
cases in 2012, increasing to 18% by 2014. The increased
sensitivity over time may have resulted from identifica-
tion of dedicated hospital focal persons, laboratorians
and the clinicians having a better understanding of the
system, ongoing efforts to sensitize clinicians to the im-
portance of the surveillance, or increased awareness
from concern over possible MERS-CoV importation.
The SevPn clinical network produced a number of
guidelines for severe pneumonia case notification and
investigation that have been used throughout Thailand.
The case and real-time laboratory results reporting in
the online severe pneumonia database allowed for expe-
dited results availability for pathogen identification as
soon as 24 h after specimen arrival at NIH, helping clini-
cians make a definitive diagnosis and improving clinician
buy-in for the system. The laboratory diagnostic testing
platform and reporting algorithm successfully expanded
the range of pneumonia pathogens able to be microbio-
logically confirmed, including newly emerging pathogens
such as MERS-CoV. The system was established in 2010
and proved an important sentinel surveillance platform
when MERS-CoV emerged in 2012; the majority of spec-
imens tested for MERS-CoV to date in Thailand have
come from the SevPn network.
Throughout the surveillance period, a pathogen was
detected in over half of the reported cases. In addition
to increasing the number of cases with an identified eti-
ology, the SevPn surveillance has led to a valuable speci-
men bank of stored specimens that could be used for
retrospective testing for new pathogens in the future
when diagnostic methods become available.
Guidelines for notification and investigation of severe
pneumonia created by this system were modified for use
in Thailand’s severe acute respiratory infection surveil-
lance, and post mortem examination guidelines devel-
oped by the pathology network for this surveillance
system informed procedures for a sub-study of the
Pneumonia Etiology Research for Child Health (PERCH)
study [16–18]. These post-mortem examination guide-
lines have frequently been used as a training tool for
non-pathologist health personnel to strengthen their
capacity to perform lung biopsy in fatal pneumonia cases
and also shared with other countries, including
Cambodia during a hand, foot, and mouth disease out-
break in 2012 [19].
Despite improvements over time, the findings from
the SevPn surveillance system have several important
limitations: (1) Case reporting was passive. We docu-
mented vast under-reporting through surveillance audits
with 86% of potential cases identified through chart re-
view not reported to the SevPn system. Low reporting
and variability by region make it difficult to know if etio-
logic findings were representative of all severe pneumo-
nia cases in Thailand. (2) Post-mortem lung biopsy
specimens were infrequently submitted, which might
have resulted from a lack of pathologists in most hospi-
tals, challenges in obtaining consent, and limited space
to conduct the procedure. (3) Despite an extensive test-
ing algorithm, a pathogen was not detected in nearly
40% of cases with specimens submitted, similar to what
has been seen in other pneumonia etiology studies
[9, 20, 21]. Detection of pathogens from respiratory
specimens does not confirm etiology, especially for bac-
teria that commonly colonize the upper respiratory tract
like S. pneumoniae and H. influenzae. Collection of lower
respiratory specimens through endotracheal tubes helped
reduce this challenge, but contamination with upper re-
spiratory flora likely occurred; further, patients who died
before intubation had only upper respiratory specimens
available. Methods used in this enhanced surveillance
could be improved if resources allowed for strengthening
the networks, in particular the clinical network and re-
gional laboratory network. In order to increase the num-
ber and quality of specimens obtained from fatal cases,
further training on obtaining consent and performing
post-mortem percutaneous transthoracic needle biopsy
would likely be beneficial.
Conclusion
Developing the capacity for enhanced surveillance for
severe pneumonia, which can be used to describe the
Table 4 Surveillance audit results for severe pneumonia enhanced surveillance network by region and time period, Thailand
2011–2014
Surveillance
region
Severe pneumonia cases reported and detected by chart review
2011–2012 2013–2014 Total
Reported
cases
Cases from
chart review
% of cases
reported
Reported
cases
Cases from
chart review
% of cases
reported
Reported
cases
Cases from
chart review
% of cases
reported
North 12 151 7.9 51 402 12.5 63 553 11.3
Northeast 0 61 0 2 39 5.1 2 100 2.0
East 4 38 10.5 18 81 22.2 22 119 18.4
Central 1 68 1.2 34 117 29.1 35 185 18.9
South 6 34 17.6 22 66 33.3 28 100 28.0
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prevalence of known as well as new pathogens, has been
important to strengthen Thailand MOPH’s preparedness
and rapid response to emerging respiratory pathogens.
Despite its low sensitivity, the SevPn surveillance system
has built a network and platform that has bolstered Thai-
land’s ability to detect emerging infectious diseases. This
capacity was demonstrated with the quick addition of
MERS-CoV to the testing algorithm in 2012. This project
has enhanced the capacity of Thailand MOPH to more
rapidly identify causes of severe pneumonia, which will
contribute to more rapid detection and control of public
health threats and thereby enhance global health security.
Although not all components of the surveillance sys-
tem will continue after 2015, the severe and fatal pneu-
monia case notification and investigation guidelines and
the post-mortem percutaneous transthoracic needle bi-
opsy guidelines remain useful tools that clinicians, la-
boratory personnel and epidemiologists can employ
during future outbreaks of severe respiratory illness of
unknown etiology. The result of the 5 years data collec-
tion can help establishment of baseline disease burden
estimates or trends for monitoring impact of new poten-
tial vaccines, especially for RSV; and facilitate other im-
proved pathogen-specific disease control efforts. The
availability of additional diagnostic assays and methods
to more fully identify potential pneumonia etiologies for
emerging and re-emerging pathogens would be beneficial
to test banked specimens from this project as well as in fu-
ture severe respiratory disease outbreaks [13, 22–24]. In-
corporating elements of this enhanced surveillance into
existing routine disease surveillance can help the Thailand
MOPH strengthen preparedness and rapid response cap-
abilities for infectious disease threats.
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